**Reed’s Rule**

Reed’s (1990) analysis of multi-member districts suggests that the number of parties in a district will be equal to one plus the district magnitude (the $M+1$ rule, which might also be called “Reed’s Rule”), and Cox’s (1997) analysis of multiple types of electoral rules extends Reed’s hypothesis, arguing that the number of parties will be capped at the district magnitude plus one. The $M+1$ rule regarding district magnitude and the number of district-level parties suggest that all electoral systems affect party systems in basically the same way, and the central difference between PR and plurality elections, then, is the larger number of representatives elected per district in the former compared to the single representative chosen per district in the latter. Indeed, PR systems can have winnowing effects on party systems as well if they have relatively small district magnitudes.

**Conditions that may hinder Duvergerian outcomes**

Cox (1997: 79) also highlights three other conditions under which FPTP may not reduce the vote for minor parties: 1) Many voters who are not short-term instrumentally rational. Voters who are not short-term instrumentally rational prioritize longer term goals, such as sustaining the existence of a smaller, less competitive party that they hope will someday become competitive, or care less about winning and more about trying to push parties in a particular ideological direction. Such voters, therefore, are willing to stay with their first preference even if the candidate is unlikely to win. 2) Widespread certainty regarding likely winners. General agreement that a particular candidate will win the race undermines incentives for voters and
elites to defect from their first choice since transferring support to a different candidate is unlikely to alter the outcome of the race. 3) The presence of many voters who strongly prefer their first choice and, thus, are nearly indifferent to other choices. Such voters are unlikely to defect to stronger candidates (for whom they have no affinity) to try to affect the race.

**The long-lasting nature of disequilibrium or non-Duvergerian equilibrium**

For example, throughout the period of mixed-member system elections in Russia and Ukraine, the average winner’s vote share hovered around 30% and the vast majority of FPTP contests were won by candidates winning less than 40% of the vote. This arguably provided very different signals to new entrants than contests in established democracies, in which winning candidates (often from the same party election after election) won election with a safe majority of the vote.

**Differences in the effect of a lack of party institutionalization on district- and national-level outcomes**

[In the text of the book we not that “In addition, the effect of poorly developed parties can extend even beyond the number of district-level competitors and shape the extent to which district-level outcomes “project” to the national level. On one level, in new democracies, FPTP rules may produce very fragmented district-level contests between many candidates.”] It should be noted that this argument is very different from the one concerning projection from the district to the national level. We are arguing that a lack of party institutionalization actually undermines the district-level, two-candidate competition that lies at the heart of the Duvergerian equilibrium. The argument concerning national level bipartism assumes that two-party competition persists at
the district level, but that this bipartism is not realized at the national level because different parties are viable in different districts.

Additional information on Israel

[In the text we note that “Thirty-three parties won at least 611 votes in the 2009 Israeli legislative election, but only twelve won more than one percent of the vote, and only two won more than 20 percent of the vote.”] All twelve with more than one percent of the vote surpassed Israel’s two percent legal threshold of representation.